Judicial Technique in Using the Agency Relation by Hardman, Thomas P.
Volume 36 Issue 2 Article 2 
February 1930 
Judicial Technique in Using the Agency Relation 
Thomas P. Hardman 
West Virginia University College of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr 
 Part of the Agency Commons, and the Civil Procedure Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Thomas P. Hardman, Judicial Technique in Using the Agency Relation, 36 W. Va. L. Rev. (1930). 
Available at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol36/iss2/2 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the WVU College of Law at The Research Repository @ 
WVU. It has been accepted for inclusion in West Virginia Law Review by an authorized editor of The Research 
Repository @ WVU. For more information, please contact ian.harmon@mail.wvu.edu. 
WEST VIRGINIA
LAW QUARTERLY
and THE BAR
VOLUME XXXVI FEBRUARY, 1930 NUMBER 2
JUDICIAL TECHNIQUE IN USING THE
AGENCY RELATION
THOMAS P. HARDMAN
A generation ago Mr. Justice Holmes said in effect that
the fundamental rule of agency, respondeat superior, does
not rest on a rational basis;' and he learnedly elaborated
the historical explanation, rather than justification, that
respondeat superiur in its modern form is the evolution of
an ancient rule which imposed liability upon the heads of
families for the acts of their slaves. However the his-
toricity of that may be,2 the legal world of today is insisting
upon a justification, rather than explanation, of everything
legal. By way of reaction from the historical jurispru-
dence and legal fundamentalism of the last generation a
*Professor of Law West Virginia University.
'HoLmEs, Agency, 4 HARV. L. REV. 345;. (1891) 5 HARV. L. REv.
1; (1891), "must be explained by some cause not manifest to common
sense alone." But see Stone, J., in Gleason v. Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co.,
278 U. S. 349, 356 (1929) (Holmes, J., concurring.)
2By the early common law it seems that a principal was not responsible
for the acts of his agents vhich he had neither commanded- nor ratified. See
POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (2d ed.) 533 (1898.)
As to the historicity of the Holmes theory see Wigmore, "Responsibility for
Tortious Acts: Its History," 7 HARv. L. REv. 315,383,441 (1894.) The rule
imposing vicarious responsibility was definitely established in Brucker V.
Fromont, 6 T. R. 659 (1796), and, though much criticized, obtains to some
extent in most civilized countries. See BATY, VicARIous LIABILrry, c. IX
(1916.)
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scientific rationalism is now in fashion.' As a result com-
mentators have variously rationalized respondeat &peior
without securing a general acceptance of any definite
rationale.4 But whatever its rationale the rule definitely
presupposes an agency relation, and how shall we rational-
ize what we may call the judicial technique in using this
relation?
In the adjudication of cases according to ldw' the courts
use certain devices, mostly so-called ".rules"l. But the law
is not merely the aggregate of these "rules";7 it is more
nearly the technique of the courts8 in using these "rules"
(and other devices); it is the prophecy, based on this
s See WIGMORE AND KOCOUREK, RATIONAL BASIS OF LEGAL INSTITUTIONS,
XIX, XX (1923.) In fact Mr. Justice Holmes has long since abandoned
the historical school of jurisprudence. See Pound, "Judge Holmes's Contri-
butions to the Science of Law," 34 HARV. L. REV. 449, 450 (1921.) Of.
Pound, "Mechanical Jurisprudence," 8 CoL. L. REv. 605 (1908).
4 Perhaps the prevailing vogue is the so-called entrepreneur theory which
is briefly explained in note 23 infra. As to this theory see Smith, "Frolic
and Detour," 23 CoL. L. REv. 444, 716, (1923), TIFFANy, AoENoy (Powell's
2d ed. 1924) 100-105; Douglas, 'icarious Liability and Administration
of Risk," 38 YALE L. J. 584, 720 (1929). Most of the numerous cases in
point do not clearly articulate any particular rationale. But see Standard
Oil Co. v. Anderson, 212 U. S. 215, 220-222 (1908); Braxton v. Mendelson,
233 N. Y. 122, 135 N. E. 198 (1922); Franks v. Carpenter, 192 Iowa 1398,
186 N. W. 647 (1922).
5As to the distinction between "justice according to law" and "justice
without law" see Pound, "Justice According to Law," 13 COL. L. REV. 600
(1913).
G The word- "rules" is herein used in the sense in which the courts gen-
erally use it, namely as including legal "rules," "principles" and "stand-
ards". As to the distinction between these and also as to legal "concep-
tions" see PouND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHiLosoPY OF LAV, 115
et seq. (1922). But for present purposes to draw these distinctions would
only serve to encumber. It should be remembered however that the judi-
cial process may include the use of other things than "rules," such as "in-
herited instincts, traditional beliefs, acquired convictions", as to which
see CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDIcIA PROCESS (1921).
7 It is usual however to say that law is an aggregate of rules. See
POLLOCK, A FIRST BOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE (3d ed. 1911) 17, 18; SALZOND,
JURISPRUDENCE (7th ed. 1924) §5.
8 And other law-administering tribunals.
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THE AGENCY RELATION
technique, of what the courts9 will do with these tools."0
Professor Green has ,recently rationalized this technique
in a number of non-agency situations;" and it is the pur-
pose of this study to attempt to rationalize some aspects
of this technique in cases in which it is sought to hold a
defendant relatianally responsible for the conduct of his
vicarius, i. e., some one undertaking a service for him.' 2 In
such cases, according to this method of approach and ad-
judication, a rationalization of the judicial process would
seem to involve the following determinations (except that
if any of these determinations should be in the negative
the judicial process would generally end there)
I. Is the claim of the plaintiff such a want or in-
terest as the judicial tribunals will secure against
injury by anyone?
II. If so, is there any legal device-any agency or
allied relation between the defendant and the actor
-any rule arising out of the relation-designed to
secure such interest by making such a defendant
relationally responsible? If not, shall such a device
be judicially created? 3
s! .
1o Compare POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAw 1 (1921): "The
common law .... is essentially a mode of judicial and juristic thinking, a
mode of treating legal problems rather than a fixed body of definite rules."
Mr. Justice Holmes, "The Path of the Law," 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 461
(1897) : "the prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing
more pretentious, are what I mean by the law." Green, "The Duty Problem
in Negligence Cases." 28 COL. L. REv. 1014, 1015 (1928): "The power of
passing judgment through formal political agencies for securing social con-
trol .... the power which operates through rules."
i1 GREEN, RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE (1927). Professor Green has
incidentally included some agency cases, but he has discussed them from
a non-agency point of view.
12 The word "vicarius" is herein used as including any person who "acts"
for another and, in one class of cases, as including any person who serves
another though the muscular movements of such person are not his acts in
the legal sense. As hereinafter indicated, the phrase "relational liability"
is used to include any liability which arises out of some relation as distin-
guished from a liability based on a personal breach of duty.
!.Such a judicially created device is the recently created family-purpose
"relation" and rule, hereinafter discussed. Cf. Beach, J., in Wolf v. Sulik,
93 Conn. 431, 435-437, 106 Atl. 443 (1919) ; Poffenbarger, J., in Jones v.
Cook, 90 W. Va. 710, 717, 111 S. E. 828 (1922). That the courts do judi-
cially create see Corbin, "The Law and the Judges," 3 YALE REv. 234; (N.
S. 1914). (A. L. C.) Comments, 27 YALE L. J. 668 (1918).
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The further inquiries referred to in the accompanying
footnote,"4 fall outside the scope of this study. In fact
only one phase of these two determinations can be adequate-
ly discussed within the limits of this article. Therefore the
first of these two will be disposed of very briefly for the
reason that it is equally applicable to non-agency cases.
I.
In determining whether a person is relationally respon-
sible for the acts of a vicarius the courts generally start
with the inquiry whether the actor is an agent or a so-
called independent contractor. But to start thus is not
to start at the beginning.
The subject-matter of all law is interests,"5 i. e., the
wants, claims or desires of an individual or of a group.
But the law does not attempt to secure all such interests
against injury even though the injury is done by the de-
fendant in person. As an eminent Dinglish judge has said
on this point :"
"It is to the protection of . . . material interests
that the law chiefly attends ..... .[Injuries to
some interests] the law does not pretend to iredress."
Hence rationally the first inquiry should be whether
the plaintiff's claim is a legally secured interest, i. e., such
an interest as the law-administering tribunals will protect
against injury by any one; for if there is no such interest,
there can be no problem of vicarious responsibility.
To illustrate: A, in the course of doing something for
another, "negligently" frightens T but does not physically
touch T. The nervous shock to T is serious. Is the person
acted for ,relationally responsible for this act of his vi-
carius which admittedly injures T's interest? Though the
14 Inquiries: iii, as to the limits of the security afforded by the "rule"
if there is such a rule; iv, as to whether there is a violation of this rule;
v. as to whether the violation caused the injury to the plaintiff's interest;
vi, as to whether there are any defences; vii, as to the quantum of damages.
As to these inquiries see, generally, GREEN, op cit. supra n. 11, at 2 at seq.
it; See PoUND, OUTLINES OF LECTuREs ON JURISPRUDENCE 79 et seq. (3d
ed. 1920); POUND, A THEORY OF SOCIAL INTERESTS (1920), XV. Publica-
tions of the American Sociological Society 16; GREEN, op. cit. supra n. 11.
16Lord Wensleydale in Lynch v. Knight, 9 H. L. C. 577, 598 (1861).
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Roman law imposed a liability in such cases,1" and justi-
fiably so, the judicial tribunals in many common-law juris-
dictions would not protect T's interest, even if the defen-
dant had personally committed the wrong complained of;"8
for, to many common-law courts, it has not seemed socially
desirable to use the force of politically organized society
to secure such interests. Hence the first inquiry in any
legal controversy is whether the plaintiff's claim is the sort
of interest that the law-administering tribunals will secure,
i. e., whether the plaintiff's interest, when balanced with
the other interests involved in the case, is sufficiently im-
portant to justify the use of the force of politically
organized society in order to protect it.
II.
If the claim is such an interest, the next rational in-
quiry is whether there is any legal device-any agency or
allied relation between the actor and the defendant-any
rule arising out of the relation-designed to secure such
interest by making the defendant relationally responsible?
But in order to create background for a criticism of the
judicial technique and in order to delineate agency as an
integral part of the larger legal picture, it is first desirable
to sketch a relational outline of agency and allied con-
sensual-vicarious relations; for, as the writer will attempt
to show, there is a legal and rational convergence of such
relations in that what we may call the sai generis inter-re-
lational distinctions are based primarily on the type of
control, 9 or non-control, of the principal or other person
17 See GAIus, INST. 3, 220; JDSTINIAN, INST. 4, 4, 1; BUCKLAND, ROMAN
LUw (1921), 584-585; Radin, "Fundamental Concepts of the Roman Law,"
12 CAL. L. REv. 481, 486-487 (1924).
IsSee Mitchell v. Rochester Ry. Co., 151 N. Y. 107, 45 N. E. 354 (1896);
Spade v. Lynn & Boston Ry., 168 Mass. 285, 47 N. E. 88 (1897) ; Chesa-
peake & 0. Ry. Co., v. Tinsley; 116 Va. 600, 82 S. E. 732 (1914); Nuckles
v. Tennessee, etc., Co., 155 Tenn. 611, 299 S. W. 775 (1927). But see Lam-
bert v.. Brewster, 97 W. Va. 124, 125 S. E. 244 (1924); Eambrook v. Stokes
Bros., (1925) 1 K. B. 141, annotated: (1925) 34 YALE L. J. 554. See
Parry, Nervous Shock as a Cause of Action in Tort," 41 L. QuAn. REV.
297 (1925).
19 "Control," as herein used, may be actual or potential. Moreover "con-
trol" is such an indefinite concept that though it is almost invariably used
by the courts as such it seems desirable to distinguish between types of
control.
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acted for over the agent or other vicarius.
Apart from special relations, e. g., partnerships, joint
stock companies and trusts as such,2" when one person
consensually serves another the person so serving may be:
(1) A completely uncontrolled accommodator,
(2) A completely controlled human machine, or
(3) A person between these extremes who may be
(i) a so-called "independent contractor" or
(ii) an agent.
In all such situations the one so serving another may be
called a vicarius and any relation arising from such con-
sensual-vicarious service we may call a consensual-vicarious
relation. When any of these relations, e. g., the relation
of principal and agent, is establi ied, certain legal con-
sequences generally flow from sue1 relation more or less
independently of the will of the pal ies.21 If the relation is
the agency relation as hereinafter defined, one legal con-
sequence is respondeat superior. The vicarious respon-
sibility, if any, so arising out of the particular relation may
be called a relational responsibility to distinguish it from
legal responsibility based on personal breach of duty. And
in general the extent of this relational responsibility, if
any, depends primarily, it is believed, upon the extent to
to which the person acted for may control the vicarious
conduct of the actor. It is true that the "control" or, more
accurately, types of control which the courts use may have
no such function under another, and perhaps a better,
method of approach.2" And it is true, as advocates of
the entrepreneur theory assert, that control is not the only
20A trustee as such is not an agent. Everett v. Drew, 129 Mass. 150
(1880); Chaffee v. Rutland R. Co., 53 Vt. 345 (1881). But, as we shall
see, he may be an agent and the cestui que trust may be a principal and
liable as such, where the cestui que trust retains the requisite control. See
further Douglas, op cit. supra n. 4 at 720 et seq.; GILBIORE, PARTNERSILIU
(1911) §9.
21Cf. PoUND, op. cit. supra n. 10; "The common-law lawyer......
thinks of the relation of principal and agent and of powers, rights, di lies
and liabilities, not as willed by the parties but as incident to and involved
in the relation."
22 For another rational and valuable method of approach see Douglas,
op. cit. supra n. 4.
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factor in fixing vicarious responsibility.23 But is it true,
as a leading entrepreneurist states, that "control" is not an
essential of such relational responsibility?24 At any rate,
under the method of approach which the courts almost in-
variably employ, "control", as herein analyzed, plays a
rational and a leading role. This is outlined in the ac-
companying footnote.25
I. "UNCONTROLLED" VICARIOUS SERVICE
At one extreme of such consensual-vicarious relations
we have what may be called accommodation. The best
illustrative case which has been found is a recent California
23 As to other factors see Douglas, op. cit. supra n. 4. See Smith op.
cit. supra n. 4 at 456, wher -he entrepreneur theory is thus summarized:
"It is socially more expedien ,to spread or distribute among a large group
of the community the losses. hich experience has taught are inevitable in
the carrying on of industry, ,bhan to cast the loss upon a few." Therefore
such losses should be cast upon the principal, the entrepreneur, for he is
normally in a more strategic position than the agent to spread or distri-
bute such losses.
24TInFANYA Op. cit. supra n. 4 at 100-104.
25 outline:
i. "Uncontrolled" Vicarious Service
a. Accommodation
Fact situation: the person acted- for may not control the
vicarius either (1) as to the manner of accomplishing the
undertaking or (2) as to the result of the undertaking. No
relational responsibility. Not an agency, relation.
b. So-called Independent Contractor Employment.
Fact situation: the person acted for may not control the
vicarius as to (1) the manner of accomplishing the under-
taking but may as to (2) the result of the undertakin.
Logically this employment should be called single-controlle4
service, but the courts commonly treat it as "uncontrolled"
employment. Also the limited liability of the employer for
the acts of such a vicarius is not a relational responsibility
as it is based primarily on the employer's breach of duty.
Hence the inclusion here. Not an agency relation.
ii. Completely Controlled Vicarious Service
Mechanical Employment.
Fact situation: the employer may control the vicarius (1)
as to the manner of accomplishing the undertaking and (2)
as to the result of the undertaking. And (3) the employer
supplies the "will". No "act" by the vicarius. Complete
control, and "vicarious" liability commensurate with such
control. Not an agency relation.
iii. Double-Controlled Vicarious Service
Agency.
Fact situation: the person acted for may control the "acts"
of the vicarius (1) as to the manner of accomplishing the
undertaking and (2) (to some extent at least) as to the
result of the undertaking. Relational responsibility commen-
surate with such control.
7
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decision.2 8 In that case one Nixon, while driving with
Fiske, was arrested for speeding. During the detention of
Nixon, Fiske with Nixon's consent undertook to go to the
central police station for Nixon in order to secure Nixon's
release.2" On this trip Fiske negligently drove the car
over the plaintiff, thus injuring the plaintiff's legally pro-
tected interest in his physical integrity. Nixon was sued.
In holding that Nixon was not liable for the negligence of
the vicarius in the course of doing such a consensual-
vicarious service the court said:28
"It is clear that ...... [Fiske] undertook what
he did in order to be of assistance to Nixon in his
difficulty and as an act of friendship from one man
to another. The doctrine of respondeat superior
sought here to be invoked by the appellants must
necessarily be based upon a relationship between
two parties by which one has the legal right to direct
the activities of the other and the latter the legal
duty to submit to such direction. Such a relation-
ship did not exist in the case at bar. If Fiske, after
undertaking his mission, had abandoned it and left
his friend in the lurch, he would have been guilty
of no breach of legal duty although undoubtedly
guilty of a most reprehensible breach of moral duty.
In this case there was no such relation as that of
master and servant, of principal and agent, or em-
ployer and employe. In the performance of his
errand, Fi&ske was at liberty to proceed to its per-
formance in any way he chose, and was not amenable
to the direction of Nimon."
The theory seems to be that, where the understanding
of the parties is that the person acted for may not control
the vicarius either (1) as to the manner of accomplishing
the undertaking or (2) as to the result of the undertaking,
then, though the injured interest of the plaintiff is an in-
terest which the law-administering tribunals will secure
against injury done by one in person, there is no legal rule
28 Stoddard et at. v. Fiske et al., 170 Fac. 663 (Cal. App. 1917).
27 Whether the undertaking was at Nixon's request is not clear.
28 At 664-665. Italics ours.
8
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or other device designed to protect such interest by making
the person so acted for relationally responsible. The fact
basis of this non-liability seems to be, largely at least, that
by virtue of having no control over the vicarious conduct
of the actor the person so acted for is not in a strategic
position to prevent the losses incident to such vicarious
acts.2" Therefore as he is not personally culpable, it is not
socially desirable that he should be saddled with the loss.
Hence in purely consensual-vicarious relations it would
seem that, if the service is a mere uncontrolled act of
courtesy or accommodation and no more, there is no agency
relation" and therefore respondeat superior is inapplicable.
Accordingly, as the Fiske Case indicates, it is immaterial
whether such accommodator is a volunteer or an invitee. In
either case he is not an agent (including "servant"), and,
without more, the person acted for incurs no relational
responsibility. 1 This does not mean that a person so acted
for may not incur liability, other than relational liability,
for the acts of such uncontrolled vicarius, as where such
actor, with the consent of the person acted for, creates a
nuisance on the latter's premises.2 But that is not rela-
tional liability, for that liability does not arise out of the
consensual-vicarious relation but is based on the fact that
the nuisance exists on the premises under such circum-
stances that, whoever created the nuisance, there is toward
certain persons a legal duty on the part of the owner of
the premises to abate it.
Much like this relation is that consensual-vicarious rela-
tion which, with considerable inaccuracy, is generally
20 cf. Douglas, op. cit. supra n. 4,. as to the respective functions of "risk
avoidance, risk prevention, risk shifting and risk distribution", in determin-
ing whether a person should incur vicarious liability.
30 Fisher v. Johnson, 238 Ill. App. 25, 30 (1925). See THE AMERICAN
LAw INSTITUTE, AGENcY, RESTATIEMENT NO. 1, §2 (1926). The cases are
legion in which it is said or assumed that such lack of control prevents the
formation of the agency relation. Cf. Fish v. Kelly, 17 Com. Bench (N. S.)
194 (1864). And see Woodrum v. Price, 104 W. Va. 382, 389, 140 S. E.
346 (1927).
31 If the car were a so-called "family automobile" and Fiske were in the
position of a so-called "member of the family," then, as we shall see, a
different result might be reached in some jurisdictions.
32 See Sturges v. Society, 130 Mass. 414, 415 (1881), a ease of an in-
dependent contractor but the principle is the same.
9
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called "independent-contractor" employment. As to this
class of vicarious. acts the Agency Restatement provides
as follows: 3
"An independent contractor is a person who under-
takes to execute certain work or to accomplish a
stipulated result for another, under such circum-
stances that the right of control of the doing of the
work, and of the forces and agencies employed in
doing it, is in the contractor."
From this provision it is apparent that the person so
acted for cannot control the acts of the vicarius as to most
matters connected with the vicarious undertaking. By
virtue of such non-control the person so acted for is normal-
ly not in an advantageous position to prevent the losses
incident to such vicarious acts. 4 Therefore just as in the
case of accommodation, there arises out of this relation the
legal rule that an employer is not relationally liable for
the acts of an "independent contractor"." It is true that
so-called "independent"-contractor employment is not fully
"independent" of control on the part of the employer. In
reality such employment is a single-controlled vicarious
service,"' for the employer retains a variable control over
the so-called independent contractor with respect to one
class of matters, namely, the result of the undertaking
And it is true that, in addition to other liability, the em-
ployer incurs a liability for such acts of his independent
contractor as (1) necessarily effect an unlawful resut"
or (2) will probably effect an unlcwful result if precautions
3S AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, AGENCY, RESTATEMENT No. 1, §6 (1926).
34As to the function of "risk (loss) prevention" in insulating the in-
dependent contractor see Douglas, op. cit. supra n. 4, at 594 ot seq.
35 Reedie v. London, etc., Ry. Co., 4 Ex. 244 (1849); Kar v. Erie 11.
Co., 118 Oh. St. 612, 162 N. E. 793 (1928). See MEOnEt, AGENCY (2d ed.
1914) §§ 1917-1920, citing numerous cases.
36 See n. 25, supra.
37 Crenshaw v. Ullman, 113 Mo. 633, 20 S. W. 1077 (1893); Harding
v. Boston, 163 Mass. 14, 39 N. E. 411 (1895) ; Giroud v. Stryker Transp.
Co., 140 Atl. 305 (N. J. 1928).
38 Ellis v. Sheffield Gas Consumers Co., 2 El. & BI. 767 (1853); Wein-
man v. De Palma, 232 U. S. 571 (1914).
10
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are not taken by the employer.' But for reasons appearing
in the accompanying footnote it is believed that this and
other exceptional liability of such an employer is not a
relational liability as it is based, primarily at least, on the
employer's personal breach of duty.0
ii. COMPLETELY CONTROLLED VICARIOUS SERVICE
At the opposite extreme of consensual-vicarious relations
we have what may be called completely controlled vicarious
service. In differentiating this class of employment a dis-
tinction should be made .between an act and a movement
which is not an act in the legal sense. "An act", says Mr.
39Norwalk Gaslight Co. v. Norwalk, 63 Conn. 495, 28 Atl. 32 (1893);
Trump v. Bluefield, etc., Co., 99 W. Va. 425, 129 S. E. 309 (1925); Wilson
v. Thayer County Agricultural Society, 115 Neb. 579, 213 N. W. 966
(1927), annotated: 37 YALE L. J. 113 (1927).
40 It would seem to be indisputable that, when one has employed an in-
dependent contractor to do something which will necessarily cause an un-
lawful result, he has thereby personally committed a breach of duty to
third persons. Where however the employment will not necessarily effect
an unlawful result but is so dangerous that it will probably effect an un-
lawful result unless precautions are taken by the employer, it may be
plausibly argued that the injury is due to the unlawful manner in which
the vicarius is accomplishing a result which could be lawfully accomplished,
and that (as the employer has no control as to the manner of such action)
therefore in such cases the employer is relationally liable for the acts of
a vicarious over which he has no control. If this argument is tenable, this
class of cases would constitute an exception to the writer's position that
control plays a rational and leading -role in fixing vicarious liability as such.
It is believed however that when one by any device exposes third persons
to such a high probability of harm, he thereby comes under a duty to such
third persons and that he cannot escape that duty by delegating perform-
ance thereof to another, whether an agent or a so-called independent con-
tractor. See Neyman v. Pincus, 267 Pac. 805, 809, (Mont. 1928); Wight V.
H. C. Christman Co., 244 'Mich. 208, 221 N. W. 314 (1928).
Analogously, as to other exceptional liability of such employers. For
example, such employers seem to be liable for the negligence of independent
contractors who, when employed, are known by the employer to be incom-
petent. See Lawrence v. Shipman, 39 Conn. 586 (1873). But obviously
thus to expose third persons to such a high probability of harm is a per-
sonal breach of duty and the resultant responsibility of the employer is
based primarily on his own culpability and not merely on the culpability
of his vicarius.
Similarly, where such an employer has resumed possession and control of
the premises and the injury results from the condition in which they are
maintained. As to this see Sturgis 'v. Society, 130 Mass. 414 (1881); Mc-
Crorey v. Thomas, 109 Va. 373, 63 S. E. 1011 (1909); Hickman v. Toole,
35 Ga. App 697, 134 S. E. 635 (1926).
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Justice Holmes,4 "is a muscular contraction, and some-
thing more ..... The contraction of the muscles must be
willed." If the vicarius, though controlled as to result and
manner of action, exercises his own will in making the
muscular movement he is in the legal sense an agent even
though he is allowed no discretion as to manner of action
or as to results to be accomplished. It is true that the
judicial technique commonly involves a different treatment.
Reflecting this judicial usage Mechem on Agency saysl'
that "where one person, in the presence and by the express
direction of another, serves as an aid in performing some
purely ministerial or mechanical part,-such as signing the
other's name ....... ,-of an act which that other is en-
gaged in performing and to which he brings his own voli-
tion, judgment and determination in all matters which con-
cern the essence of the transaction, the act is regarded in
law as the direct and personal act of the latter."
Such assertions are believed to be unsound. If a muscular
movement of a vicarius is willed by him there is in the
legal sense an act by the vicarius and if the other essentials
of agency are present, the actor is legally an agent and in
general the sui generis agency doctrines may apply just as
if he were an agent of the highest rank." Where how-
ever the movement of a vicarius is not willed by him but
by the person for whom the movement is made, then, quite
apart from the agency doctrine of qui facit per aliure facit
per se, the movement of the vicarius is in legal contempla-
tion the act of the person supplying the will, and there is,
normally at least, complete vicarious liability. The vicarius
so used is a mere human machine functioning only as
willed by the other." Legally the act is, in general, the
same as if an inanimate machine had been employed. Such
service is admittedly not true agency.
But in Mr. Mechem's case of a person directed by another
to sign such other's name and to sign in the presence of
such other, the person so signing is in the legal sense con.
41 HoLEs, THE CommoN LAw 54 (1881).
42 MECHEZ,, op. cit. supra n. 35, §63.
43 Cf. Seavey, "The Rationale of Agency," 29 YALE L. J. 859 (1920).
44 See n. 12, supra.
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sensually doing an act for another and in so acting owes
to that other the ordinary duties of an agent, e. g., the duty
of obedience and the duty of loyalty. It is true, as Mr.
Mechem argues, that such an employe' without having
authority under seal may sign an instrument which must
be under seal and yet bind the employer." But this does
not prove Mr. Mechem's proposition that "these are not
cases of agency, in the ordinary sense, at all"." It only
proves that in such cases there are qualifications. of the over-
technical doctrine that authority of an agent to execute
a document necessarily under seal must be conferred by
instrument under seal. Such person then is an agent and
the vicarious liability of the principal, though different in
extent, is not different in kind from what it would be if the
agent were allowed a discretion. 7
Where the movement of the vicarius is not willed by him,
not only is the relation not agency but the relation is not
necessarily consensual. If the will of the vicarius is coerced
by the person whose "act" the movement is, the relation is
not consensual and therefore does not belong in this study.
But if the person whose "act" the movement is simply sup-
plies all the will without coercing the consent of the vi-
carius, as where the vicarius is, with his consent, "hypno-
tized" or, without the exercise of his will, is otherwise
consensually utilized by another, the relation, though con-
sensual-vicarious, is not an agency relation, for in the legal
sense the only act is that of the person supplying the will.
In other words, in the case of completely controlled vi-
carious service there is a rule designed to secure the legally
recognized interests of third persons when injured by the
defendant's human machine, but it is not a relational rule
as it is, in the legal sense, based on the defendant's own
acts.
III. DOUBLE-CONTROLLED VICARIOUS SERvIcE: AGENCY
Between these two extremes is the consensual-vicarious
45 See, e. g., Gardner v. Gardner, 5 Cush. 483 (Mass. 1850), and SToRY,
AGENCY §51 (1863).
46 MEOHEM, op. cit. supra n. 35. at p. 161.
47 Cf. Seavey, op. cit. supra n. 43.
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.relation where the understanding of the parties is that the
person acted for may control the actor not only (1) as to
the manner of accomplishing the undertaking but also (2)
(to some extent at least) as to the result of the undertak-
ing. 8  This control we may call double control. Properly
speaking, this type of control is a sine qua, non to respondett
superior as a rule of relational responsibility though the
judicial technique in using this rule is commonly otherwise
as to one class of cases hereinafter explained."
In passing it may be parenthetically observed that herein
all vicarious acts are called service, whether they are done
by an "agent" or by a so-called "servant"' who is really
an agent." In this class of service then, as the person acted
for, whether principal or so-called "master", has control
over the manner in which the vicarius acts and, to some
extent at least, over the result to be accomplished, it is a
legal consequence peculiarly incident to this relation that
the person so acted for is, within the scope of the under-
taking, liable for the unlawful manner of accomplishing
the undertaking as well as for the unlawful results of the
undertaking.2  This is due, largely at least, to the fact
that by virtue of having such double control the person so
acted for, the entrepreneur, is in a strategic position to
prevent and perhaps to distribute the losses incident to
48 See Singer Manufacturing Co. v. Rahn, 132 U. S. 518, 523 (1889).
49 Namely, the so-called "family-automobile" cases; but those cases are
hereinafter differentiated.
5O See State ex rel. Key v. Bond, 94 W. Va. 255, 118 S. E. 276 (1923)
as to the alleged distinction between "agent" and "servant."
51 See Brown v. German-American Title, etc., Co., 174 Pa. 443, 451, 34 A
335 (1896): "In legal essence there is no difference between the relation of
naster and servant and that of principal and agent, the terms 'servant'
and 'agent' being fundamentally interchangeable, and the distinction be-
tween them being evidential only." The cases and commentators however
usually attempt to make a disinction. See, e. g., MEcrnx op. oit. supra
n. 35, §§36-39.
52Brucker v. Fromont, supra n. 2; Wilton v. Middlesex B.. Co., 107
Mass. 108 (1871); Cosgrove v. Ogden, 49 N. Y. 255 (1872); Gleason v.
Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co., supra n. 1, annotated:- 38 YALE L. J.
827 (1929). See generally, Laski, "The Basis of Vicarious Liability," 26
YALE L. J. 105 (1916).
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such vicarious undertakings."
A leading advocate of the entrepreneur theory says that
there are four indicia of the entrepreneur, viz., (1) "con-
trol", (2) ownership (legal or equitable) of the property
used in the vicarious undertaking, (3) the chance to share
the profits, if any, to be derived from the enterprise and
(4) the chance to share the losses, if any, that may result
from the undertaking. 4 Accordingly this writer says that
he who has "a majority of these attributes" is the en-
trepreneur and as such is vicariously liable.5 It follows
that, if one has all these indicia except "control", he is the
entrepreneur and is relationally responsible for the acts of a
vicarius committed within the scope of the undertaking.
But however desirable this conclusion may be, the cases
do not support the theory to this extent. 8 When a person
though sharing in indicia (2), (3) and (4) does not have,
actually or potentially, what the writer has called double
control, the vicarius, if he is either an "agent" or an "in-
dependent contractor", is an "independent contractor" '57
and, as we have seen, the exceptional liability of an em-
ployer for the acts of an "independent contractor" is not a
relational liability.55  It would seem then that, subject to
an explanation hereinafter made, double control is a sine
qua non to respondeat superior as a rule of relational re-
sponsibility. 9
Another leading advocate of the entrepreneur theory
53 There is no consensus of opinion as to the rational basis of respondat
superior. And that problem as such cannot be fully discussed in this
article. See Dougles, op. cit. supra n. 4, as to the functions of "risk pre-
vention," "risk shifting" and "risk distribution" (and also as to "risk
avoidance") in fixing vicarious liability.
54 TIFFANYA op. oft. supra n. 4, at 100-104. See 20 COL. L. REv. 333(1920)
U, Ibid.
tcE. g., in McNamara -v. Leipsig, 227 N. Y. 291, 125 N. E. 244 (1919),
which has been relied upon to show that "control" is immaterial or not
essential. 20 COL. L. REV. 333, 335, 336 (1920), the court declared that
the person held responsible had "control". And this conclusion seems consis-
tent with the facts, though much can be said to the contrary. See also
Billig v. Southern Pac. Co., 189 Cal. 477, 209 Pac. 241 (1922).
57 See THE AMERIcAN L&w INSTITUTE, AGENoY RESTATEMENT No. 1, §6,
quoted at n. 33 supra.
5 See n. 40, supra.
59An apparent exception to this statement is the so-called family-pur-
pose doctrine, hereinafter explained.
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asserts" that the law in fixing the limits of vicarious
liability draws some distinctions which do not rest even
partly on differences in "control". Thus the law holds one
relationally responsible for the unauthorized torts of an
agent while the agent is on a so-called "detour" 1 but not
while the so-called "agent" is on a "frolic" of his own.02
Accordingly it has been said by this entrepreneurist that
the person acted for has just as much "control" or rather
just as little "control" in the -one case as in the other and
that therefore "control" does not justify the distinction
between "frolic" and "detour". 3 But as to such anti-control
argument the following reply may be made.
Preliminarily it must not be understood that "control"
is a mere magical concept which can be used as a panacea
for all agency and allied ills. We have progressed beyond
that stage of legal development when a jurisprudence of
conceptions reigned." We must not rely unduly on a mere
"language" technique; we must rely more on a "judging"
technique; 5 we must rationalize the judicial technique in
using the more or less unarticulated connotations of con-
trol, departure, detour and the like,-the various devices
with which judgments are made. Nbw, when an agent is
on a so-called detour, i. e., is doing what he undertook to do
but is doing it in a round-about way (a bad way but never-
theless a way), the agency relation still existR and that
relation, as well as its fundamental rule, is based primarily
on double control though secondarily other factors," either
singly or in combination, may play more or less important
roles. But when the so-called "agent" is on a "frolic" of
his own he is really not an agent. 7  He has suspended the
GO Smith, op. cit. supra n. 4.
61 Ritchie v. Waller, 63 Conn. 155, 28 Atl. 29 (1893); Dunne et al v.
Hely et al., 140 Atl. 327 (N. J. 1928).
62 Joel 'v. Morrison, 6 C. & P. 501 (1834) is the classic authority on this
point. See also Groatz v. Day, 81 N. H. 417, 128 Atl. 334 (1925).
63 Smith. op. cit. supra n. 4. at 455.
64See Ewart, Waiver Distributed, (1917), iii-vi (Foreword by Roscoe
Pound). Cf. Cardozo, J., in Hynes v. New York Central R. R. Co., 231
N. Y. 229, 235-236, 131 N. E. 898 (1921).
65 Of. Green, op. cit. supra n. 10, at 1016 et seq.
.66 Hereinafter indicated.
67 Cardozo, J., speaking for the court in Fiocco v. Carver et al., 234
N. Y. 219, 137 N. E. 309 (1922), says that during such departure the
actor has "broken" and "suspended" the agency "relation2
16
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 2 [1930], Art. 2
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol36/iss2/2
THE AGENCY RELATION
agency relation. As Mr. Justice Holmes has said :68 "No
free man is servant [agent] all the time". And when he
who should be acting as an agent goes on a frolic of his
own, i. e., wholly depar'ts from what he undertook to do, he
to the extent of, and during, such departure renounces the
double control and resumes his status as a non-agent. For
such renunciation he may of course be liable to his prin-
cipal or quandam principal. But until the agency relation
is, in the language of Judge Cardozo, 0 "re-established", e. g.,
by timely return to what we may call the proper route,
there can of course be no relational responsibility, for
respondeat superior arises out of the agency relation. It
is the renunciation of double control (with the resultant
suspension of the agency relation) that plays the leading
role in holding that there is no -relational responsibility.
By virtue of such renounced control the quondam principal
or entrepreneur is normally a somewhat less effective loss
preventer.0 During such departure the business done is
hardly his. It is therefore socially undesirable to saddle
his business with such loss.
The so-called volunteer cases aptly illustrate all classes
of consensual-vicarious relations. Thus when one volun-
teers to act for another and that other consents to such
undertaking the other is or is not relationally liable for the
torts committed within the scope of the undertaking de-
pending primarily upon the type of control or lack of con-
trol over the vicarious conduct of the actor. Normally in
as Holmes, "Agency," 5 EA]v. L. REV. 1, 16 (1891).
00 Cardozo, J., speaking for the court in Fiocco v. Carver et al., supra
n. 67, refers to this re-establishment as the "resumption of a relation
which has been broken and suspended." See, accord, Orris v. Tolerton &
Warfield Co., 201 Ia. 1344, 207 N. W . 265 (1926).
70 It may be thought that, in this respect,'there is no distinction between
frolic and detour and that therefore the difference in results between frolic
and detour must be justified on other grounds. See Douglas, op. cit. supra
n. 4. But in the genera]ity of cases (and rules must be formulated for the
generality of cases) may we not say that when an agent is on a detour-
accomplishing an undertaking in a round about way-he has not fully re-
nounced the control of the person acted for, but that when one who should
he acting as agent has completely departed from his undertaking for an-
other be has, to a greater degree at least, renounced the control of that
other. To some extent are not rules for the guidance of the conduct of
the vicarius normally less effective in cases of departure than in cases
of mere detour?
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case of volunteers the control, if any, is double control,
though a volunteei might be an uncontrolled volunteer or a
completely controlled volunteer, which we have already
considered. The Fiske Case 1, sufficiently illustrates
the relational legal consequence in case of uncontrolled
volunteers. The well known case of Hill v. Morey"2 will
suffice as an illustration of a volunteer undei double con-
trol. There the defendant was repairing a fence. A neigh-
bor who happened to be present, without any request from
the defendant, began to assist the defendant. In so assist-
ing, the neighbor cut a tree on the plaintiff's land. The
defendant had impliedly consented to this assistance and
the defendant had assumed a "control", for he cautioned
the neighbor to be careful not to cut trees standing upon
the plaintiff's land, and to such assumption of control the
neighbor silently consented. This control by the person
acted for applied to (1) the result of the undertaking, in
that trees were to be cut and (2) the manner of accomplish-
ing the undertaking, in that the cutting was to be "careful"
etc. Thus the objectively judged understanding of the
parties73 was that the defendant had assumed a double con-
trol over the acts of the vicarius. And therefore the court
correctly held that the agency [master-and-servant] relation
existed and that the defendant, the entrepreneur, had in-
curred a relational liability commensurate with the assumed
control and with the consequent ability of the entrepreneur
to prevent and perhaps to distribute the loss encountered."'
In Hill v. Morey the volnteer's act was one of mere
courtesy by a friend, just as in the Fiske Case,7 and the
only primary factual difference between the two cases
(which justifiably reach contrary conclusions) is that in
Hill v. Morey the objectively judged understanding of the
parties was that the person so acted for held a double con-
71 Stoddard et al. v. Fiske et al., supra n. 26.
7226 Vt. 178 (1854).
73 As to the objective test see Holmes, J., in O'Donnell v. Clinton, 145
Mass. 461, 463, 14 N. B. 747 (1888); WIG3ORE, EVIDENCE (2d- ed. 1923)
§2466.
74 See n. 53 supra.
75S upra n. 72.
T6 Supra n. 26.
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trol over the volunteer, whereas in the Fiske Case the un-
derstanding was that there was to be no control over the
vicarius. Therefore in Hill v. Morey the volunteer was
an agent pro hac vice and in the Fiske Case he was an un-
controlled accommodator, a non-agent.
Sometimes what the writer has called double control may,
as to the result to be accomplished by the vicarius, be a
very limited control. Thus the fact situation may be such
that, as to the manner of action, the actor is fully subject
to the control of the person acted for, but that, as to the
result of the undertaking, the actor may do what he likes
so long, of course, as it is for the other. But even here
there is a limited control as to result, because the result is to
be "for the other" or it is not vicarious action. Hence
agency involves at least some control as to the result of
the undertaking."'
The influence of this type of control in fixing vicarious
responsibility is further shown by the fact that a special
relation which as such is not an agency relation may be-
come also an agency relation when the person acted for
holds a double control over the actor. 8 For present pur-
poses this is sufficiently illustrated by the fact that, though
the relation of trustee and cestui que trust is not as such
an agency relation," nevertheless it is also an agency rela-
tion (the trustee is an agent in addition to being trustee,
and the ecstui que trust is also a principal, and respondect
superior is applicable) when the cestui que trust, in addi-
tion to his limited normal control, has control as to the
manner of accomplishing the purposes of the trust, i. e.,
has double control." It is by virtue of this type of control
77 Railroad Co. v. Hanning, 15 Wall. (U. S.) 649, 657 (1872); Singer
'Manufacturing Co. v. Rahn, supra n. 48 'at 523; Chisholm's Case, 238
Mass. 412, 419, 420, 131 N. E. 161 (1921).
-8 See, e. g., Geary etc., R. Co. v. Rolph, 189 Cal. 59, 207, Pac. 539
(1922) ; 1 CooK, CORPORATIONS (8th ed. 1923) §§ 249, 253.
79 Taylor v. Davis, 110 U. S. 330, 334, 335 (1884); Farlardeau v.
Boston Art Students' Assoc., 182 Mass. 405, 65 N. E. 797 (1903). See
MECImEi, op cit. supra n. 35, at §§42, 43.
50 See Sweet, "Trusteeship and Agency," 8 L. QUAB. REV. 220 (1892);
Scott, 'Liabilities Incurred in the Administration of Trusts," 28 HAv. L.
REv. 725, 736, 737 (1915).
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that such a cestui que trust, as entrepreneur, is, like other
principals, normally in a strategic position to prevent and
perhaps to distribute losses incident to the vicarious under-
taking so that it is socially desirable to hold him relation-
ally responsible for such losses.
Suppose however that for lack of double control or for
other reason the consensual relation is not an agency rela-
tion and that there is no legally recognized relation between
the defendant and the actor, and no rule arising out of the
situation designed to secure the plaintiff's legally protected
interest by making the defendant relationally responsible.
The question then arises whether such a relation and rule
shall be judicially created; for it must be admitted (whether
we like to do so or not) that today the courts do judicially
legislate,"' interstitially, 2 if not otherwise. By way of
illustration and by way of differentiation, just a word should
be said about a relation which in the judicial technique is
commonly used as if it were agency but which is not agency.
For want of a better name we may call it the "family-pur-
pose" relation. It is much like agency, being a consensual
quasi-vicarious relation which, in many jurisdictions, arises
when an automobile is operated as a "family car" by a
member of the family or by a person in the position of a
member of the family, such member not being the owner of
the car but using it with the consent of the owner.8 " Clearly
the relation is not agency, because the action is not vicarious
(the person so using the car is not acting for another) and
because there may not be the requisite double control. Is
there then any rule arising out of this relation designed to
secure the legally protected interests of third persons by
s1 See Corbin, op. cit. supra n. 13; Judge Pound, "Some Recent Phases
of the Evolution of Case Law," 31 YALn, L. J. 361 (1922).
82 See Mr. Justice Holmes in Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U. S.
205, 221 (1917): "Judges do and must legislate, but they can do so only
interstitially; they are confined from molar to molecular motions." See also
CAnDOZO, op cit. supra n. 6, at 113 et seq., and CARDOZO, TnE Gow'rI OF
THE LAW (1924).
83 Birch v. Abercrombie. 74 Wash. 486, 133 Pac. 1020 (1013); King v.
Stnythe, 140 Tenn. 217, 20W4 S. W. 296 (1918); Johnson P. Evans, 141 linn.
356, 170 N. W. 220 (1919) ; Ambrose v. Young, 100 W. Va. 452, 130 S. E.
810 (1925) are examples. But all jurisdictions do not accept the family-
automobile doctrine. See, e. g., McGowan v. Longwood, 242 Mass. 337, 136
N. E. 72 (1922); Smith v. Callahan, 144 Atl. 46 (Del. 1928). See, collect-
ing and discussing cases, Latin, "Vicarious Liability and the Family Auto-
mobile," 26 MICH. L. REV. 846 (1928).
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making the owner relationally responsible for the acts of
such other? Only a few years ago there was no such rule."'
But more recently many courts have judicially created
such a rule' and they generally call it a rule of agency.8
It is a limited qui-facit-per-auto-fait-per-se doctrine87 ap-
plicable to so-called family-purpose automobiles, though
doubtless it would, within limits, be applicable to family-
purpose aeroplanes.
When then does this family-purpose relation arise? Two
very recent decisions interestingly illustrate the judicial
teqhnique in this respect. In one case' X gave his estab-
lished housekeeper a general permission to use his car as a
family automobile. In so using the car the housekeeper
negligently drove it into another car which was thereby
forced against a third person who was rightfully on the
sidewalk. Is X relationally responsible for this tort of
his housekeeper? Such housekeeper-just as in the other
recent case 9 an adult son living with his father and partly
dependent on his father-is, as a practical matter, a member
of the family and financially dependent upon the head of
the family, the owner of the car. Now, the plaintiff's
claim is admittedly a legally protected interest. And, as a
practical matter, the only way the law can normally secure
such an interest in such cases is to hold the only person
who is financially responsible, the owner of the car."° When
one so launches such a semi-dangerous instrumentality and
thereby subjects third persons to such a high probability of
84 See Doran P. Thompson, 76 N. J. L. 754, 71 Atl. 296 (1908); Parker
v. Wilson, 179 Ala. 361, 60 So. 150 (1912).
5 In addition to the cases cited supra n. 83 see, e. g., Foster 1. Farra,
117 Ore. 286, 243 Pac. 778 (1926); Goss P. Williams, 196 N. C. 213, 145
S. E. 169 (1928).
8oSee e. g., Stickney v. Epstein, 100 Conn. 170, 123 Atl. 1 (1923), com-
mented upon in (1924) 33 YALE L. P. 780.
ST Cf. Notes 28 HAnV. L. REv. 91, 93 (1924).
ssSmart v. Bissonette, 106 Conn. 447, 138 Atl. 365 (1927).
89 Watson v. Burley, 143 S. E. 95 (W. Va. 1928.)
Do It is interesting .to note how this conclusion compares with the famous
historical theory, advanced by Mr. Justice Holmes, that respon4eat superior
"is in fact, the survival from ancient times of doctrines which in their
earlier form embodied certain rights and liabilities of heads of families
based on substantive grounds which have disappeared long since." See
Holmes, op. cit. supra n. 1. But it is believed that the family-purpose
doctrine is a sui generis rule arising out of a special relation.
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harm from a member of his family who is, as a rule, fi-
nancially irrespozisible 9 it is socially desirable that such
owner should, within limits, be liable for such probable
harm, 2 especially since, by means of insurance or otherwise,
he is today in an advantageous position to distribute (or
shift) such losses. Hence, in many jurisdictions there
arises out of this relation the non-agency rule that, when a
motor-driven conveyance is being used, not by the owner but
with the consent of the owner and by a person who is a
member of the family or in the position of a member of
the family, the owner is, within the limits of the rule, 3
relationally liable for the negligent operation of such
conveyance.
These cases admirably illustrate the distinction between
what Dean Pound has aptly called "law in books" and "law
in action"." The law in books is that one is not relational-
ly responsible for such acts unless there is agency. But
in many jurisdictions the law in action is otherwise-the
judicial technique in using the "agency" relation is such
that there is, within limits," a relational responsibility,
though there is no agency, if there is the allied family-
purpose relation.
What then is the agency relation? The Restatement
answers this question thus : "The relation of Agency is
the consensual relation existing between two persons by
virtue of which one of them is to act for and in behalf of
91 Cf. Jones v. Cook, supra n. 13.
92The doctrine is much like the dangerous instrumentality doctrine
which is also a non-agency doctrine. In fact such liability is sometimes
based on the dangerous instrumentality doctrine. See Southern Cotton Oil
Co. v. Anderson, 80 Fla. 441, 86 So. 629 (1920). As to the dangerous
instrumentality doctrine see Hforack ,"The Dangerous Instrument Doctrine,"
26 YALE L. J. 224 (1917).
93 After it has been determined that there is a rule designed to secure
an interest, the next inquiry is whether the loss encountered comes within
the zone of security afforded by the rule. But such inquiry does not come
within the scope of this article. The limits are not thb same in all
jurisdictions that adopt the rule. As to the limits of the family-purpose
rule see Rauckhorst v. Kraut, 216 Ky. 323, 287 S. W. 895 (126) ; O'Keefe
v. Fitzgerald, 106 Conn. 294, 137 Atl. 858 (1927).
'4See Pound, "Law in Books and Law in Action," 44 AM. L. REV. 12
(1910).
95 See n. 93 supra.
96 THE AirrBICAN LAW INSTITUTE, (1926) AGENCY, RESTATEMENT NO. 7
§2. Italics ours.
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the other and subject to his cotrol". This is the usual
language technique. 97 But, as has already been indicated, a
so-called independent contractor is a person acting for an-
other and "subject to his control" with respect to one class
of matters." Such control then may, with different legal
results, be either single control or double control, or even
other control. Therefore it would seem that a definition of
agency which uses and does not define this legally ancipi-
tous word is a. definition which needs further defining. In
fact we may say with Professor Green"0 that "defining is
largely a mirage. Define a term of one word into a dozen
and we are immediately called on for a definition of these
other words". And yet in adjudicating any agency case the
judicial technique normally involves the use of a definition
of the agency relation. Therefore in order that we may be
able to use or to prophesy how the courts will use this de-
vice, we must acquire and, as well as we can, articulate the
technique of its use. Accordingly it is suggested that, as
a working device, this legal relation may be articulated
somewhat as follows: The agency relation is the relation
which exists when one competent 0o person consensually un-
dertakes a service for another and subject to a control of
that other both with respect to the result of the undertaking
and with respect to the manner of accomplishing the under-
taking. 101
97 See, e. g., Seavey, op. cit. supra n. 43, at 868; Beasley v. Whitehurst,
147 S.-E. 194 (Va. 1929).
08 See Hughes v. Ry. Co., 39 Oh. St. 461 (1883); Frassi V. McDonald,
122 Cal. 400, 55 Pac. 139 (1898); Gulf Refining Co. v. Wilkinson, 94 Fla.
114 So. 503 (1927); Bojarski v. M. F. Howlett, Inc., 291 Pa. 485, 140 Atl.
664, 544 (1928).
09 GREEr op. cit. supra n. 11, at 3 in the footnote.
100 Though the competency of a person to be either an agent or a princi-
pal is not a problem within the scope of this study, it should be noted in
passing that some persons are incompetent to create the relation of princi-
pal and agent. For example, children so very young that they could not,
in the legal sense, even voidably do an act, obviously could not, by mere
consensual arrangement, create a true agency relation. See Howe v. Cen-
tral Vt. Ry. Co., 91 Vt. 485, 101 Atl. 45 (1917) (a child of two and a
half years held incompetent).
101 Of. Khoury v. Edison Electric Illuminating Co., 164 N. E. 77, 78
(Mass. 1928).
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